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Assured child support benefits are an important component of many proposals to reform the
child support system. The authors estimate the likely effects of assured benefits on poverty and
welfare participation when (a) parents eligible for child support work the same number of hours as
they currently work and (b) parents eligible for child support change the number of hours they work in
order to maximize their income and leisure time. They find that in each situation assured benefits will
reduce poverty rates and the poverty gap; welfare caseloads and expenditures will also fall. When
parents are allowed to change the number of hours they work, the impact of assured benefits will be
about the same, but the costs of the assured benefit program will increase.Incorporating Labor Supply Responses into the Estimated Effects of an Assured
Child Support Benefit
Over half of all children who live in families headed by women without spouses are poor
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993 [p. 14, Table 5]). One of the reasons why the percentage is so high
is that many of these families do not regularly receive child support. Several proposals to reform the
child support system have been made to improve this situation. A particularly important one is the
assured child support benefit (see, for example, Garfinkel & McLanahan [1986], Ellwood [1988],
Lerman [1989], and the National Commission on Children [1991]). An assured benefit is a specific
amount of child support guaranteed by a public entity; efforts are made to collect child support from
the noncustodial parent; if that parent contributes less than the amount of the assured benefit, the
difference is paid from public funds. There are several variants of assured benefit proposals; they
differ in the amount of the guaranteed benefit, who is eligible, whether the benefit will be taxed, and
how the benefit will interact with the main cash program for single parents, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).
Proponents have claimed that this reform would increase the well-being of many families who
are economically vulnerable, would be superior to means-tested cash programs, and may not cost a
great deal if accompanied by other reforms that increase the amount of child support collected from
the noncustodial parents of AFDC recipients (e.g., Garfinkel et al., 1990). They have argued that an
assured benefit would decrease AFDC recipiency for at least two reasons. First, for some single
parents who receive welfare, assured benefits will be greater than AFDC payments; such parents are
predicted to leave AFDC in response to an assured benefit. Second, even if assured benefits are
smaller than AFDC grants, some welfare recipients will still be induced to leave AFDC and seek paid
employment: combining the assured benefit with increased earnings would make life off welfare
preferable to life on welfare. An assured benefit is therefore predicted to increase the work effort of
custodial parents who are AFDC recipients; however, it is predicted to decrease the work effort of2
custodial parents who are not AFDC recipients, because any increase in unearned income is thought to
lead to decreased hours of work for those who do not receive welfare.
A standard governmental approach to new policy proposals like the assured benefit is to
estimate their effects through microsimulation models. The basic model, TRIM, has been used
extensively and has been selected to eventually estimate the impacts of assured benefits. However,
TRIM does not currently incorporate labor supply changes, and, as noted above, labor supply changes
may be an important effect of an assured benefit.
Our work here builds on previous efforts of researchers at the Institute for Research on
Poverty (IRP) who have estimated the labor supply effects of several types of assured benefits
(Garfinkel et al., 1990; Meyer, Garfinkel et al., 1991; Meyer et al., 1992; Kim, 1993). We have
improved the model those researchers used and employ a different data source, the 1987 panel of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation. The estimates we report in this paper were made in
response to a request by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, which was interested in the ability of
the IRP model—both in its original and its improved form—to predict labor supply effects. (Indeed,
the IRP model is the only current model that estimates labor supply effects.)
The theory underlying this improved model and the methods of obtaining these estimates are
briefly explained in section I. In section II we present the estimated effects of three levels of assured
benefits on poverty, welfare participation, labor supply, and costs. In section III we show how the
results would differ if we changed the form of the assured benefit. Section IV presents information on
the sensitivity of our results to changing the way we estimate labor supply responses. We offer
conclusions in section V.3
I. THEORY, METHODS, AND DATA
Direct Effects of an Assured Benefit
In the absence of labor supply changes, an assured child support benefit will increase the
incomes of custodial-parent families, which will decrease the number in poverty and shrink the poverty
gap. An assured benefit could also decrease AFDC recipiency if the amount of the assured benefit
fully offset AFDC and was larger than the amount of AFDC currently received. Similarly, food stamp
recipiency could be decreased. Estimation of these effects is relatively straightforward, and several
estimates have been completed (e.g., Lerman, 1989).
Incorporating Labor Supply Changes
An assured benefit might change the number of hours custodial-parent families work, however,
and this could affect estimates of poverty reduction, welfare use, and costs. The traditional static
model of labor supply in microeconomics holds that individuals select the number of hours they will
work after considering the tradeoff between increased income and decreased leisure that results from
working more hours. This theory predicts that custodial parents not receiving AFDC who begin to
receive an assured benefit will decrease the number of hours they work. (Any increase in unearned
income should decrease labor supply because individuals could achieve the same total income as
before while working fewer hours.)
However, AFDC recipients may increase the number of hours they work. The traditional
microeconomic model of labor supply has also been applied to AFDC recipients (e.g., Graham &
Beller, 1989). It assumes that individuals considering AFDC recipiency make a decision on welfare
recipiency and labor supply simultaneously, selecting whether to receive AFDC and how much to
work based on how much leisure and income they would have under all possible scenarios. The
standard model predicts that some nonworking AFDC recipients may find that combining an assured4
benefit and earnings would make them better off than continuing to receive welfare. Thus, the theory
predicts potential increases in hours for AFDC recipients (Garfinkel et al., 1990). Because theory
predicts opposite effects for AFDC recipients and nonrecipients, the direction of the aggregate effect
on labor supply is ambiguous.
The degree to which individuals change their labor supply in response to changes in other
income is the subject of many empirical articles (for reviews, see Killingsworth and Heckman [1986]
and Pencavel [1986]). Our approach here is to take one of these formulations of the way labor supply
is affected by changes in income and use it to estimate the labor supply effects of an assured benefit.
Microsimulation Methods
A model that attempts to predict the labor supply responses to a policy change needs to have a
basis on which to make these predictions. Our model is based on microeconomic theory and previous
research: we assume that individuals consider the amount of leisure they would have (with a
preference for more leisure) and their net income (with a preference for more net income) in making
decisions about whether to work and how much to work. We assume that individuals make decisions
about their labor supply (and whether they will receive AFDC, the assured benefit, or both) on the
basis of the choice that provides them the highest level of utility. We borrow from the previous
research of Johnson and Pencavel (1984), who have estimated an equation that can be used to
calculate utility for individuals based on their income and the number of hours they work. More
technical information on this utility function is provided in Appendix I.
Our approach employs several steps. We first identify the current hours of work of each
family in the sample. Net income is then calculated by summing earnings, child support, AFDC, food
stamps, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and other income, and then subtracting income and
payroll taxes. These amounts are used to calculate current utility.5
An assured benefit is then introduced. In the "no labor supply response" estimates, we begin
with a simple determination of whether the family is eligible for the assured benefit. If it is not, the
policy has no effect. If it is, we assume the family receives the assured benefit, and recalculate AFDC
and food stamp benefits and net income. Note that these estimates do not rely on the utility
formulation.
The "labor supply response" procedures are more complicated. Again, if the family is not
eligible for the assured benefit, the policy has no effect. If the family is eligible, we assume the
family considers several possible hours of work. The family selects the number of hours of work
based on the option that provides the highest utility. In the model, this involves calculating net
income at several potential hours points (which involves determining whether the family is eligible for
AFDC and food stamps at each point), calculating utility at each point, and assuming that the family
selects the point of highest utility.
In the final simulation step, these individual predictions of income, program participation,
hours worked, and assured benefits are multiplied by the sample weights and then totaled to calculate
the predicted aggregate effects of the assured benefit.
This model improves upon our previous simulation model that predicted the effects of an
assured benefit (Garfinkel et al., 1990; Meyer, Garfinkel et al., 1991, 1992) by incorporating a
different labor supply response methodology. In the previous models, we drew an exact budget line
for each woman and calculated maximum utility on each segment of the budget line. But the
calculation of the exact line is quite difficult when there are multiple programs, so the early work
ignored food stamps and the EITC. The method used here does not try to map an exact budget line,
but simply calculates income at each potential hours point, including income from any program for
which a family is eligible. This approach allows us to incorporate the full range of income transfer
programs. Second, in previous models we assumed that the labor supply response parameters for6
single mothers were appropriate for remarried custodial mothers. We now use different responses for
wives and single mothers. Third, we are now assuming that husbands and wives make their labor
supply decisions jointly. Finally, in previous models, we estimated the existence of a child support
award and the amount of child support each family received. We are now using each family’s report
on whether or not there is an award and on the amount of child support paid, when we have this
information, and only imputing this when it is not available.
1
Data
The data used are drawn from a nationally representative survey, the 1987 panel of the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our base sample is drawn from wave 6 of the 1987
panel, which includes data from September 1988, because wave 6 includes information on child
support. Information from wave 2 was also used because it includes information on the
interrelationships of every member of the household and thus enables us to identify stepparent families
that would not be identifiable from wave 6.
2
For this research, we select family units with children under the age of eighteen who have a
living nonresident parent. The sample includes 1441 families, including 925 single-mother families;
131 single-father families; 318 two-parent families in which mothers had children from absent fathers;
40 two-parent families in which fathers had children from absent mothers; and 27 two-parent families
in which both mothers and fathers had children demographically eligible for child support.
SIPP has several advantages over other potential data sets. It was particularly designed to
collect detailed information on transfer program recipiency, and thus has questions about benefit
payments under AFDC and food stamps for each month. This monthly information is valuable,
because eligibility for these welfare programs is determined on a monthly rather than an annual basis.
SIPP also includes a special set of questions on child support, including whether a child support
agreement exists, what year it was agreed to, the amount of the award, how payments were to be7
made, and the amount received. SIPP is a better data set than the Current Population Survey–Child
Support Supplement (CPS-CSS) used in previous models. The CPS-CSS misses the following groups
of custodial parents: (a) mothers who had no children from the most recent divorce or separation but
had children from an earlier divorce or separation; (b) mothers who are currently married but had
children out of wedlock; and (c) custodial fathers. In this study these missing custodial parents are
included by using the topical module on household relationships. As expected, the SIPP estimate for
the total number of custodial parents (12.1 million, including both mothers and fathers of children
under eighteen) is much larger than that of the CPS-CSS data (9.4 million, including only mothers of
children under twenty-one).
We have made several changes to the data recorded in the SIPP. First, because AFDC
recipiency is seriously underreported, we impute AFDC amounts and AFDC recipiency to some
female-headed families.
3 When food stamps are reported by a family, we calculate the amount
determined by the food stamp formula, and use this amount, rather than the amount reported.
4 We
estimate income taxes and the EITC according to the 1988 tax law, assuming that all families take the
standard deduction. We also estimate wages of nonworkers in our sample.
5 For custodial families
without child support information, we also impute the existence of an award and the amount of child
support collected.
6 Finally, we calculate annual income by multiplying September 1988 income by
twelve.
Table 1 provides information on our sample, comparing the characteristics of the sample when
using reported information and when using the information after our adjustments have been
incorporated. Note that the simulated AFDC caseload and benefits are closer to administrative record
data than are reported amounts: administrative records show an average monthly caseload in the
AFDC-single-parent program of 3.5 million families and benefits of $15.2 billion in fiscal year 1988
(U.S. House of Representatives, 1993).8
TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics: Child-Support-Eligible Families with Children under 18





Total people in poverty (millions) 12.48 12.51
% people in poverty 33.7% 33.8%
Total poverty gap (billions) $16.76 $11.46
Income distribution—% of families whose incomes are:
Below the poverty line 33.3% 33.2%
Between 100% and 200% of the poverty line 25.5% 31.1%
Between 200% and 300% of the poverty line 16.4% 19.0%
More than 3 times the poverty line 24.8% 16.7%
AFDC
Total caseload (millions) 2.16 3.28
% families on AFDC 17.9% 27.1%
Total benefits (billions) $9.40 $13.92
Total benefits minus CS collections (billions) $8.74 $12.63
Food stamps
Total caseload (millions) 2.69 3.39
% families receiving food stamps 22.2% 28.0%
Total benefits (billions) $5.45 $6.34
Private child support
b
Among custodial-mother families (n=10.7 million)
% custodial families with awards 56.5% 55.3%
% total award that is collected 74.7% 72.6%
Mean award amount for those with awards $2656 $2713
Mean payment for those with awards $1986 $1969
Among custodial-father families (n=1.4 million)
% custodial families with awards n.a. 27.3%
% total award that is collected n.a. 44.1%
Mean award amount for those with awards n.a. $2272
Mean payment for those with awards n.a. $1002
Sample size 1441
Total families (millions) 12.11
Source: 1987 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
aThe poverty items based on reported information use an income definition in which reported earnings,
child support, AFDC and food stamp benefits, and all other taxable and nontaxable income are
included. The poverty items based on simulated information define income as the sum of reported
earnings and all other taxable and nontaxable income, predicted child support payments, and calculated
AFDC, food stamp, and EITC benefits minus calculated income and payroll taxes. Note that this
differs from the reported income in three ways: (1) child support payments, AFDC benefits, and food
stamp benefits are imputed; (2) earned income tax credits are calculated and included; and (3) income
and payroll taxes are calculated and subtracted.
bWe use reported child support information when it is available and impute the existence of awards,
the amount of an award, and the amount of child support collected for three groups: (a) mothers who
had no children from the most recent divorce or separation but had children from an earlier divorce or
separation; (b) mothers who are currently married but had children out of wedlock; and (c) custodial
fathers.9
Limitations
Despite its improvements on previous research, this study is limited in several areas. First, our
labor supply response model has some limitations. We assume that parameters estimated in the 1970s
can be used as a starting point for estimating responses in the 1990s. In addition, we ignore the
possibility that some would like to work (or work more) but may not be able to find employment (the
demand side of the labor market is ignored). Moreover, although we present findings based on
different parameter values, we do not present results based on alternative forms of the utility function.
We also do not incorporate fixed costs of working in our model. Finally, we do not allow for stigma
effects of AFDC, and these could be substantial (Garfinkel et al., 1990).
Second, the model is static, rather than dynamic. Thus, although policies for an assured benefit
would include some rules about recouping public costs in later periods, these have been ignored here.
This model examines only the effects of an assured benefit on individual labor supply and welfare use;
possible effects on remarriage or fertility are not incorporated. Possible effects beyond the individual
family level are also ignored. Effects on noncustodial parents are also neglected.
Although this model is an improvement over previous models in that it incorporates food stamps
and the EITC, it does not incorporate Medicaid. To the extent that Medicaid provides an important
benefit available only to those on AFDC, we overestimate the number of women who will leave
AFDC because of the assured benefit. Kim (1993) found that ignoring Medicaid values overstates the
number of families who leave AFDC. However, as Medicaid has been made more available to low-
income families through recent policy changes, this omission becomes less serious.
At least two types of costs are not included: administrative costs (or savings) and child care costs.
Finally, some cautions are needed if policy implications for the year 1994 are to be drawn from
1988 estimates. The EITC has changed dramatically since 1988 and is now much more generous.
Changes have occurred in the child support system that should result in increased prevalence of awards
and increased collections of private child support. Medicaid is now more available to low-income
families. Tax changes have also occurred. In order to apply these estimates to the current year, such
changes should be kept in mind, but the effect of these changes is not clear. The expanded EITC10
provides an example of the ambiguity that could result: perhaps many of the families that we predict
to leave AFDC because of the assured benefit would have already left due to the expanded EITC,
meaning that the estimates of caseload reductions presented here are too high. On the other hand,
perhaps some families that we predict to stay on AFDC after being exposed to an assured benefit
would exit if they have both an assured benefit and an expanded EITC available, meaning that these
estimates of caseload reductions are too low.
II. BASIC RESULTS
We estimate three baseline schemes, as follows:
"Low Benefit, Award Required": the benefit for one child is $1500/year; $2000/year for two
children; and $2500/year for three or more children. Only cases with current child support
awards are eligible for the assured benefit.
"Middle Benefit, Award Required": the benefit for one child is $2000/year; $3000/year for two
children; $3500 for three children; and $4000 for four or more children. Only cases with current
child support awards are eligible for the assured benefit.
"Middle Benefit, Cooperators Allowed": the benefit for one child is $2000/year; $3000/year for
two children; $3500 for three children; and $4000 for four or more children. Cases with current
child support awards and those who "cooperate" with the child support agency are eligible. We
define cooperators as all AFDC recipients and 30% of those who do not receive AFDC and do
not have current awards.
These assured benefit schemes were suggested by the CBO and are being used in the CBO’s
estimates of the effects of various child support proposals.
7 All assured benefit levels are in 1988
dollars. In these baseline results, the assured benefit is not subject to income taxation, is not limited to
the poor, and, for AFDC recipients, reduces AFDC benefits dollar for dollar. The assured benefit is
also counted as income for determining food stamp benefits. In all these results, all custodial families
who are eligible for the assured benefit receive the maximum amount (i.e., the assured benefit is not
capped at the dollar amount of the child support award).
For each of these schemes, we present results without and with labor supply effects. In each
section, we first review our estimates without labor supply responses, and then discuss the difference
made by incorporating labor supply behavior.11
The first panel of Table 2 presents changes in poverty and welfare participation. Looking first at
the results when labor supply is not incorporated (the "NLS" columns), we see that the low-benefit
scheme has very little effect on the number of people in poverty (down 1.8%) or the poverty gap
(down 2.8%). (Note that the poverty estimates are for custodial-parent families only, not for all
families with children.)
8 The poverty gap decreases more than the number of people in poverty
because many people in poverty receive the benefit but are not brought above the poverty line. AFDC
caseloads decline by 4%, and AFDC costs decrease even more, over 9%. AFDC costs decline by a
higher percentage than the caseload because not all AFDC recipients who receive the assured benefit
leave AFDC, but the amount they receive in AFDC decreases. Food stamp caseloads and payments
decline by only a small amount, in part because any family that remains on AFDC has no change in
income (the assured benefit is completely offset by a decline in the AFDC amount) and thus no
change in food stamp benefits.
The middle-benefit scheme available only to those with awards results in moderate declines in
poverty among custodial-parent families (down 4%) and the poverty gap (down 5%); moderate12
TABLE 2
Baseline Results: Poverty, Welfare Participation, and Labor Supply Responses
to an Assured Child Support Benefit
Low Benefit, Middle Benefit, Middle Benefit,
Award Award Cooperators
Required Required Allowed
NLS LS NLS LS NLS LS
Percentage changes in poverty and welfare participation:
People in poverty -1.8% -2.1% -3.7% -4.5% -7.1% -8.0%
Poverty gap -2.8% -2.9% -4.9% -5.4% -11.6% -13.4%
AFDC caseloads -3.9% -4.7% -7.8% -8.7% -27.0% -32.0%
AFDC payments -9.4% -9.5% -14.0% -14.1% -48.6% -49.3%
Food stamp caseloads -1.0% -1.0% -2.9% -3.1% -4.1% -6.2%
Food stamp payments -1.8% -2.1% -3.3% -4.1% -8.0% -10.0%
Labor supply effects:
Among women originally on AFDC (current mean hours/yr=212)
Post-reform mean hours 212 219 212 225 212 263
% nonworkers who
begin to work 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 8.0%
Among women originally not on AFDC (current mean hours/yr=1483)
Post-reform mean hours 1483 1465 1483 1456 1483 1447
Among men originally not on AFDC (current mean hours/yr=1964)
Post-reform mean hours 1964 1958 1964 1954 1964 1950
Among all women (current mean hours/yr=1109)
Post-reform mean hours 1109 1098 1109 1093 1109 1098
Among all men
a (current mean hours/yr=1942)
Post-reform mean hours 1942 1936 1942 1932 1942 1928
Costs and savings (1988 dollars, in millions)
Total gross cost
b $4434 $4434 $7608 $7608 $15,983 $15,983
AFDC savings $1304 $1323 $1942 $1959 $6761 $6863
Food stamp savings $115 $133 $212 $261 $509 $634
EITC savings $0 $-39 $0 $-64 $0 $-87
Income tax savings $0 $-244 $0 $-349 $0 $-434
Net cost
c $3014 $3261 $5454 $5800 $8713 $9008
Source: Authors’ computations based on 1987 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Notes: NLS = no changes in labor supply are allowed; LS = changes in labor supply are allowed.
Poverty estimates are for custodial-parent families only.
aThis category includes a few men originally on AFDC.
bTotal gross cost is the total cost of the public share of the assured benefit.
cNet cost is defined as the total gross cost minus all savings presented.13
declines in AFDC caseloads (down 8%) and AFDC costs (down 14%); and smaller effects on food
stamp caseloads (down 3%) and food stamp costs (down 3%). When "cooperators" (some of those
without awards) are allowed to receive the assured benefit, the decline in poverty is greater (7% for
the number of people in poverty and 12% for the poverty gap), and the decline in AFDC caseloads
(27%) and costs (49%) is substantial. Because all AFDC recipients are defined as "cooperators," all
are eligible for the assured benefit, and thus many are predicted to leave AFDC.
Incorporating labor supply responses into our estimates of the effects of the low-benefit scheme
makes little difference except in the percentage who are predicted to leave AFDC. In fact,
incorporating labor supply affects estimates of AFDC caseload reductions more than AFDC benefit
reductions in all three schemes. This is because estimates without labor supply count those who
would receive only a very small dollar amount of AFDC benefits as recipients. When these
individuals are allowed to change their labor supply, some of those who are close to the breakeven
point are predicted to work more and move off welfare, decreasing the caseload by a higher
percentage than decreases in costs. In both middle-benefit schemes, the incorporation of labor supply
responses results in further reductions in poverty and welfare use, as expected. The labor supply effect
is increased when cooperators are allowed to receive the assured benefit: for example, incorporating
labor supply decreases the poverty gap by 0.5 percentage points when awards are required and by 1.8
percentage points when cooperators are allowed to receive the benefit.
The next panel shows labor supply effects for five groups: women receiving AFDC, women not
receiving AFDC, men not receiving AFDC, and all women and men. As expected, women originally
receiving AFDC do not work a great deal prior to the reform (an average of 212 hours/year). Under
the low scheme, we estimate that about 1% of these women who were not working would begin
working. The estimates under the middle scheme/award only are a little larger, 3%, but increase to
8% when cooperators are eligible. Women and men not currently receiving AFDC are predicted to
decrease work, because they now have some added income available to them. Again, the effect is
fairly small for the low scheme and, while larger for the two middle schemes, is still modest (a mean
decrease of 2% of the hours worked by women not on AFDC and 1% of the hours worked by men not14
on AFDC in the middle-cooperators scheme). The increase in hours worked by women receiving
AFDC almost exactly offsets the decline in hours by women not receiving AFDC, so that average
hours worked by all women decline by about 1% in all three schemes.
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The final panel of Table 2 shows estimates for some costs and savings, in millions of 1988
dollars (recall that administrative costs and savings are ignored). Looking first at the NLS columns,
we see that the first line shows the gross amount of the assured benefit, $4.4 billion in the low
scheme, $7.6 billion in the middle scheme–award only, and $16.0 billion in the middle scheme with
cooperators, all without labor supply responses. This cost is predicted to be offset somewhat by
AFDC savings ($1.3 billion, $1.9 billion, and $6.8 billion in the three schemes), and, to a much lesser
extent, by food stamp savings ($0.1 billion, $0.2 billion, and $0.5 billion, respectively), making a net
cost of $3.0 billion, $5.5 billion, and $8.7 billion. Note that allowing cooperators to be eligible for an
assured benefit increases the cost of a middle-level benefit from $5.5 billion to $8.7 billion, about $3.2
billion.
Incorporating labor supply effects increases the net cost somewhat. While there are higher AFDC
and food stamp savings when labor supply responses are allowed, there are also increased costs in two
areas. When more low-income families begin to work, costs of the EITC program increase, up to $87
million in the middle scheme with cooperators. (Note that the EITC parameters used are those in
effect during 1988, not the current parameters, which are much higher, which would increase costs.)
Further, the lower work hours of custodial parents not receiving AFDC translates into lower income
taxes collected. All these factors combined increase the cost estimates by $247 million, $346 million,
and $295 million, respectively.
III. DIFFERENT TYPES OF ASSURED BENEFITS
Making the Assured Benefit Subject to Income Taxation
The first panel of Table 3 repeats selected information from Table 2 to facilitate comparisons.
The second panel shows the effects if the public portion of the assured benefit (that is, the part not15
paid by the noncustodial parent) is subject to income taxes. In the results without labor supply
responses (NLS), this change has no effect on the decline in the poverty gap, primarily because poor
families have incomes too low to pay taxes. (Recall that our poverty definitions are based on after-tax
income, so taxing the benefit could have an effect on poverty if poor families paid income taxes.)
Similarly, there is no effect on AFDC caseload reductions: because most AFDC families have incomes
too low to pay income taxes, an untaxed assured benefit and a taxed assured benefit have the same
effect. By comparing the NLS results between the first and second panel, we see that the taxation of
the public portion of the assured benefit saves $0.5 billion, $0.9 billion, and $1.3 billion,
respectively.
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Incorporating labor supply responses has about the same effects whether or not the benefit is
subject to income taxation. The same percentage of nonworking women on AFDC are predicted to
begin to work, since these women are generally not making enough money to pay income taxes.
Recall that non–AFDC recipients are predicted to decrease their hours in response to an assured
benefit. If the benefit is taxed, a smaller decline in their labor supply occurs, since these families are
eligible for a smaller benefit. But these changes are fairly small, and the aggregate labor supply effect
of a benefit that is taxed is quite similar to one that is not.
11 Finally, the labor supply results16
TABLE 3
Effects of Making the Assured Benefit Subject to Income Taxation or an Income Test
%
Nonworking
% Change % Change Women on % Change Net Cost
in Poverty in AFDC AFDC Who in Mean Hours in Millions
Gap Cases Begin to Work Women Men (1988 Dollars)
Baseline: No income taxes on assured benefit
Low benefit, award required
NLS -2.8% -3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $3014
LS -2.9% -4.7% 1.1% -1.0% -0.3% $3261
Middle benefit, award required
NLS -4.9% -7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $5454
LS -5.4% -8.7% 2.8% -1.4% -0.5% $5800
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed
NLS -11.6% -27.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $8713
LS -13.4% -32.0% 8.0% -1.0% -0.7% $9008
With income taxes on assured benefit
Low benefit, award required
NLS -2.8% -3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $2535
LS -2.8% -4.7% 1.1% -0.9% -0.2% $2740
Middle benefit, award required
NLS -4.9% -7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $4590
LS -5.3% -8.7% 2.8% -1.4% -0.4% $4945
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed
NLS -11.6% -27.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $7388
LS -13.3% -31.1% 8.0% -1.2% -0.5% $7745
With income test on assured benefit
Low benefit, award required
NLS -2.8% -3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $1797
LS -2.9% -4.7% 1.1% -0.4% -0.2% $1873
Middle benefit, award required
NLS -4.9% -7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $3346
LS -5.4% -8.7% 2.8% -0.5% -0.4% $3455
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed
NLS -11.6% -27.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $5641
LS -13.4% -32.0% 8.0% +0.1% -0.5% $5627
Source: Authors’ computations based on 1987 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Note: NLS=no changes in labor supply are allowed; LS=changes in labor supply are allowed.17
are identical to the non-labor-supply results in that a taxed benefit saves up to $1.3 billion over the
untaxed benefit.
Income Testing the Assured Benefit
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the effects if the assured benefit is available only to the poor
and near-poor. There are several methods of limiting eligibility; the particular provision we simulate
allows all families with incomes up to twice the poverty line to receive full benefits.
12 Families with
incomes over twice the poverty line have the assured benefit decreased by 21 cents for each dollar of
additional income (the current EITC benefit-reduction rate). These provisions ensure that custodial
families with high incomes do not receive a benefit.
Comparing the NLS rows in panel 1 and panel 3 reveals that income testing has no effect on the
poverty gap or AFDC recipiency. It does affect costs, however. In the NLS rows, the income test is
predicted to save $1.2 billion, $2.1 billion, and $3.1 billion in the three schemes.
Turning to the estimates with labor supply effects, we see that income-tested benefits have the
same effect as non-income-tested benefits on the percentage of nonworking women on AFDC who
begin to work. This occurs because this income-testing scheme does not affect low-income families.
Because the assured benefit is not available to higher-income custodial-parent families, the decrease in
labor supply of these families predicted with the baseline benefit does not occur with the income-tested
benefit. (However, the decrease in labor supply for low-income and moderate-income non–AFDC
families continues.) These effects translate into smaller declines in aggregate hours, and, for the
middle scheme with cooperators, the aggregate labor supply of custodial mothers actually increases.
13
Comparing the first and third panels, the labor supply results suggest a little larger savings from
income testing than did the results without labor supply: adding the income test results in a decline in
costs of $1.4, $2.3, and $3.4 billion in the results with labor supply compared to $1.2 billion, $2.1
billion and $3.1 billion in the results without labor supply. Looking just at the bottom panel, the cost
estimates with and without labor supply are quite similar for the income-tested benefit: in fact, the cost
estimates from the labor supply results are lower than for the results without labor supply in the18
middle scheme with cooperators. (Recall that incorporating labor supply increases some costs and
decreases others; whereas the increases usually outweigh the decreases, an overall decrease is quite
possible.)
The two changes shown in Table 3 can be thought of as two different ways to target more of the
benefits to the poor and near-poor. In the second panel this is done indirectly, through the tax system;
in the third panel this is done directly. Note that both these methods save funds but decrease poverty
and AFDC recipiency by the same amount as the untargeted benefit. As expected, an explicit income
test saves more funds than making the benefits taxable. Of course, costs, poverty reductions, and
welfare reductions are not the only factors to consider in whether to make the benefit income tested;
for example, income testing typically leads to higher administrative costs per case, leads to high
marginal tax rates for some, and may lead to stigma (see Meyer et al. [1992] for a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of income testing the benefit).
IV. SENSITIVITY TO LABOR SUPPLY ASSUMPTIONS
In Table 4 we test two alternative ways to predict labor supply changes. The first two panels show
results presented before: without and with labor supply responses under three schemes. The next panel
shows the result of a simple change: changing the number of options individuals have in the number
of hours they can work. In the baseline labor supply model, we allowed women to select from the
current number of hours per week, every hour per week for 5 hours below and above the current
number of hours, and every 5 hours elsewhere between 0 and 60 hours/week.
14 We allowed men to
select from the current number of hours per week, every 5 hours between 0 and 30 hours/week, every
hour/week between 30 and 50/week, and every 5 hours between 50 and 6019
TABLE 4
Sensitivity of Baseline Results to Labor Supply Assumptions
%
Nonworking
% Change % Change Women on % Change Net Cost
in Poverty in AFDC AFDC Who in Mean Hours in Millions
Gap Cases Begin to Work Women Men (1988
Dollars)
No change in labor supply
Low benefit, award required -2.8% -3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $3014
Middle benefit, award required -4.9% -7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $5454
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed -11.6% -27.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $8713
Change in labor supply: Baseline
a
Low benefit, award required -2.9% -4.7% 1.1% -1.0% -0.3% $3261
Middle benefit, award required -5.4% -8.7% 2.8% -1.4% -0.5% $5800
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed -13.4% -32.0% 8.0% -1.0% -0.7% $9008
Change in hours points allowed
b
Low benefit, award required -2.9% -4.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% $3012
Middle benefit, award required -5.0% -8.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.2% $5464
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed -12.3% -30.1% 0.8% 0.8% -0.3% $8589
Change in elasticities: Lower elasticities
c
Low benefit, award required -2.8% -4.4% 0.7% -0.7% -0.1% $3175
Middle benefit, award required -5.0% -8.2% 0.8% -1.1% -0.3% $5736
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed -12.2% -29.8% 3.7% -0.9% -0.4% $9007
Change in elasticities: Higher elasticities
d
Low benefit, award required -2.9% -5.0% 1.2% -1.1% -0.3% $3253
Middle benefit, award required -6.4% -11.0% 5.0% -1.2% -0.7% $5765
Middle benefit, cooperators allowed -16.9% -36.7% 15.1% -0.2% -1.0% $8892
Source: Authors’ computations based on 1987 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
aThe baseline employs labor supply parameters estimated by Johnson & Pencavel (1984), which imply total income elasticities of
-.128 for female heads, -.124 for wives, and -.211 for husbands, and imply uncompensated wage elasticities of .236 for female
heads, .398 for wives, and .107 for husbands. The baseline also allows a different set of hours points for men and women. For
men, we allow the current hours, and every 5 hours/week between 0 and 30 and between 50 and 60, and every hour between 30
and 50/week. For women, we allow the current hours, and every hour/week for five hours below and above the number of hours
that each woman currently works, and every 5 hours elsewhere.
bIn this run, we allow the current hours, and 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, & 60 hours/week for all individuals.
cFor a sensitivity test to labor supply parameters, we change the uncompensated wage elasticities. In this run, we assume .117 for
female heads, .256 for wives, and .019 for husbands.
dThis run assumes uncompensated wage elasticities of .468 for female heads, .754 for wives, and .213 for husbands.20
hours/week. In the variant shown in the third panel, we assume that the only hours available to an
individual are their current number of hours, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, or 60 hours/week. We anticipated
that this would dampen the labor supply effects, since small changes in the number of hours are not
allowed. The results are consistent with this expectation. There is a small dampening of the poverty-
reducing effect and the AFDC-reducing effect in all schemes. A larger dampening is seen in the labor
supply responses of women receiving AFDC and not working: fewer than 1% of these women begin
to work in the middle scheme with cooperators, compared to 8% in our baseline results. (However,
the ones who do begin to work, work more hours in this scenario than in the scenario that allows more
potential hours points.) The decline in labor supply among non–AFDC men and women is also
dampened, however, and now we predict a small increase in mean hours over all women and a small
decrease among men. The assured benefit is predicted to cost somewhat less than the baseline labor
supply estimates ($0.2 billion, $0.3 billion, and $0.4 billion less, respectively). This occurs primarily
because the declines in labor supply among higher-income non–AFDC couples are not as pronounced,
so income tax revenues are not reduced by as much as they are in the baseline run.
The final two panels show the results when we alter the degree to which labor supply responds to
changes in wages (the uncompensated wage elasticities). (We do not test alternate income elasticities.)
We present one set of results using smaller elasticities and one with higher elasticities, as follows:21
Baseline Lower Elasticities Higher Elasticities
Female
Heads
Income Elasticity -.128 -.128 -.128
Uncompensated
Wage Elasticity .236 .117 .468
Wives Income Elasticity -.124 -.124 -.124
Uncompensated
Wage Elasticity .398 .256 .754
Husbands Income Elasticity -.211 -.211 -.211
Uncompensated
Wage Elasticity .107 .019 .213
For single females and wives, the lower elasticities were set at about half the baseline.
15 The
higher elasticities were set at about double the baseline. These are still within the range estimated by
some economists (see Killingsworth & Heckman [1986] and Pencavel [1986]).
Comparing the results in panel 4 with those in panel 2, we find that the lower elasticities result in
somewhat fewer families leaving AFDC, as expected. Aggregate hours change a little, but the
predicted costs are quite similar. Through comparing panel 5 with panel 2, we see that the higher
elasticities result in a larger decline in the poverty gap, more families leaving AFDC, and more
nonworking AFDC recipients beginning to work. Because of the opposing effects on AFDC and
non–AFDC families, the estimated aggregate hours of work are sometimes above and sometimes
below the baseline estimates. Net costs are predicted to be quite similar to the baseline labor supply
runs.
In general, the results for the three different elasticities are more similar than they are different,
perhaps increasing the confidence in these estimates. Extensions of this work could use a completely
different specification of the utility function, rather than relatively simple changes in elasticities.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented microsimulation estimates of various effects of an assured child support
benefit. The effects are generally similar to previous microsimulation estimates, except that we are22
now predicting that an assured benefit would be more costly. (These estimates are compared to
previous estimates in Appendix II.)
Two types of labor supply responses are predicted in response to the assured benefit: some
individuals receiving AFDC are predicted to work more, and some individuals not receiving AFDC are
predicted to work less. These effects tend to offset one another, so aggregate labor supply is not
predicted to change a great deal.
The size of the estimated labor supply effects depends on the type of assured benefit being tested.
If the assured benefit is low and available only to women with awards, the incorporation of a labor
supply response has very little effect on the estimates. In the two other schemes tested, the effect is
somewhat larger, increasing the poverty-reducing and welfare-reducing effects of an assured benefit,
and increasing its estimated costs. Estimated costs increase for two reasons: first, non–AFDC
custodial families work less and therefore pay less in taxes; second, more working low-income
families mean higher expenditures in the EITC program. Estimates of welfare caseloads are affected
more than estimates of welfare costs, primarily because the labor supply model predicts that women
receiving a small benefit are likely to move off welfare and into the labor force.
Incorporating labor supply has about the same effects whether or not the benefit is subject to income
taxation. If the assured benefit is income-tested, the decrease in hours among non–AFDC recipients is
dampened, leading to a prediction of very similar costs between the results with and without labor
supply.
Because these estimates rely on the same labor supply response function, we presented information
on three alternate methods for determining labor supply response. These tended to produce very
similar results.
In summary, incorporating labor supply does change some estimates, generally in directions that
could be predicted. Perhaps the estimated increase in net costs is most significant: the incorporation of
labor supply adds between $200 million and $300 million to estimates of the net cost.
While there have been no pilot tests of an assured benefit that is available to all custodial-parent
families, a version of an assured benefit, the Child Assistance Program, or CAP, has been23
experimentally tested in New York. The assured benefit in the CAP program is available only to
those who were once AFDC recipients who have child support awards, is income tested, and is higher
than the amount of the assured benefits tested here ($4200/year for two children).
16 Based on data
from the first two years, Hamilton et al. (1993) find a significant labor supply effect of CAP: those in
the experimental group had 25% higher hours of work and 17% higher employment rates than those in
the control group. A second significant finding is that the percentage of custodial parents with child
support awards increased by 24%. However, there was no significant effect on child support
payments, the percentage receiving cash assistance (mainly AFDC), or on cash benefit amounts. These
experimental results suggest that an assured benefit will have positive effects on the labor supply of
AFDC custodial parents, just as we have predicted here. The potentially offsetting decreases in labor
supply for non–AFDC recipients are not tested by CAP, since it is available only to former AFDC
recipients.
In previous simulation estimates conducted at the IRP, we assumed that there would be increases in
the prevalence of child support awards, the amount of awards, and the collection rate. In these results,
we do not assume any of these increases, although allowing cooperators is the same as estimating an
increased prevalence of awards without any increased collections. Indeed, this is what has been found
in CAP, suggesting that the cost estimates presented here may be more accurate in the short run. If
improvements in the collection of child support can be achieved, the costs in the long run would be
lower. And even if the short-run cost estimates are accurate, they should be weighed against the
benefits shown here, particularly the benefit of decreasing poverty among a very vulnerable group of
children and their families.24
APPENDIX I
The Labor Supply Response Model
The static microeconomic theory of labor supply assumes that individuals choose the number of
hours they will work and whether they will receive welfare benefits based on the alternative that
provides the highest utility.
The form of the utility function that we use to determine the response to an assured benefit is the
augmented Stone-Geary direct utility function used by Garfinkel et al. (1990), Meyer, Garfinkel et al.
(1991), and Meyer, Phillips, and Maritato (1991), and is given as follows:
(1)
for single-mother families; and
for married-couple families; where
(2)
In these equations:
C = annual consumption of market goods;
Hn = annual hours of work (1 for husband, 2 for wife; when not subscripted this refers to
single women);
bn = marginal propensity to consume leisure;
d = subsistence consumption;25
an = total time available for work;
m and R = indexes that normalize C and H in accordance with the size and composition of the
household;
en = an error term representing tastes for work; and
Wn = the hourly net wage.
Maximization of the utility formulation subject to a budget constraint yields an optimal number of
hours:
H=a(1-b)R - b(n - dm)/w + e
for single-mother families, and
H1 = a1(1-b1)R1 - b1(n - dm+w 2*a2*R2)/w1 + e1
H2 = a2(1-b2)R2 - b2(n - dm+w 1*a1*R1)/w2 + e2
for married-couple families, where n = net unearned income (and thusC=n+w 1H1 +w 2H2).
Because directly estimating the parameters of this utility function is beyond the scope of the
present paper, we draw on results from the existing labor supply literature. For our estimates of the
labor supply effects, we use the results obtained by Johnson and Pencavel (1984) in their analysis of
the labor supply response to the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME-DIME).
In particular, for single women we assume b = .128, d = -2,776, a = 2,151, m = 1-.401*ln(1+K) (K
being the number of children in the family under the age of eighteen), and R = 1-.071P (P being 1 if
there are preschool-age children in the family, 0 otherwise). For married couples we assume
b1 = .2113, b2 = .1238, d = 1,616, a1 = 2,587, a2 = 2,012, m = 1+1.069*ln(1+K), R1 = 1, and R2 =1 -
.051P.
Because the optimal hours of work predicted by the equation do not match the observed hours
of work for individual families, the epsilon terms (which can be thought of as representing "tastes" for
work) are defined as the difference between optimal hours and observed hours. The epsilon terms are
then incorporated into the utility function as shown in equations 1 and 2, and this forces observed
hours to be optimal hours for more than 97% of the individuals in our sample.
Individuals not working present two particular complications: first, we have no wage for
them, so we must estimate wages (the estimating equations are available upon request). Second,
individuals not working are typically not on the margin of going to work, so a random epsilon term is26
drawn from a standard normal distribution. Additional details on this procedure can be found in
Garfinkel et al. (1990).
The labor supply model contains the following steps:
1) The amount of each family’s unearned income is determined.
2) Net wages are determined for workers and estimated for those who are not working.
3) A version of the optimal hour equation (without the epsilons) is used to determine the
epsilon terms.
4) Net income under the assured benefit regime but at the current number of hours of
work is calculated. Utility is then calculated.
5) Net income under the assured benefit regime is calculated at several possible hours
points. Utility at each point is calculated, with the family selecting the number of
hours of work that provides the highest utility. The number of hours selected
implicitly determines whether the family receives AFDC or food stamps.
6) These individual predictions are multiplied by the sample weights and then totaled to
calculate the predicted aggregate effects.2728
APPENDIX II
Comparison of These Results with Previous Results
A few simulation studies have provided estimates of the effects of an assured benefit (Lerman,
1989; Meyer, Garfinkel et al., 1991). To compare our estimates with those from other studies, we
select a similar level of assured benefit from each study; unfortunately, the levels are not exactly
comparable. We compare our baseline results with two studies that also have assured benefits that are
limited to custodial parents with awards and are not income-tested.


































% Change in Poverty Gap -3% -2% -2%
% Change in AFDC Caseload -5% -3% -4%
% Change in Mean Hours Worked by
Women on AFDC 3% 4% N.A.
Net Costs (billions) $3.3 $0.4 $1.2
All dollar amounts are expressed in 1988 figures for comparison.
The estimated effects of assured benefits on the poverty gap and on AFDC recipiency in this
study are similar to those in the other studies. As indicated earlier, our estimated cost is higher than
the previous estimates reported in Meyer, Garfinkel et al. (1991), although the amount of our assured
benefit is slightly lower on average. Two sources contribute to this difference. First, our sample from
SIPP includes additional custodial parents who are not counted in the CPS-CSS, which leads to higher
cost estimates. The second source is the new method of determining child support, as noted in29
endnote 1: while Meyer, Garfinkel et al. imputed child support variables for all custodial parents
based on estimating equations, we use reported child support information whenever it is available.
Since many custodial parents with awards actually receive nothing, the use of imputed child support
amounts underestimates the public cost of an assured benefit and thus the net cost as well. For these
reasons, we believe that our cost estimates are more realistic than those of Meyer, Garfinkel et al.30
Endnotes
1Because we wanted the original simulation model to incorporate potential changes in awards and
payments, we designed the original methodology to use estimating equations for the child support
variables. Specifically, we divided each case into three parts, one part that always had a child support
award, one part that was predicted to gain an award because of various child support reforms, and one
part that did not have an award and was not predicted to gain one. This division was based on a
multivariate equation that predicted the probability of having an award. For the two subparts with a
child support award, we then predicted the award amount based either on the current system or on
estimated noncustodial-parent income (which uses a multivariate estimating equation) and the
Wisconsin percentage-of-income standard. Finally, we predicted the percentage of that award that is
paid, again using a multivariate equation. This method made changing the probability of gaining an
award, changing award amounts, or changing the collection ratios fairly easy.
We have discovered that this methodology did not work very well when we tried to estimate
the current system. In general, our method tended to decrease the variance in payments because we
were using estimated amounts. When the current system is being evaluated, it is relatively
straightforward to change the model to use actual award status, award amounts, and payment amounts.
These estimates are presented here. (The problem of reincorporating some variance into various
predictions for the basic IRP model is one that we continue to work on.)
Because this change results in many cases with child support awards but without any child
support payments (or very low child support payments), estimates of the net public cost of an assured
benefit are now higher: net costs of a low-level assured benefit (described below) that is available
only to custodial-parent families with child support awards using these data and the old method were
estimated to be $1.2 billion. Using the new method, net costs are estimated to be $3.3 billion.
2Merging wave 2 with the main sample of wave 6 results in 149 cases which have information in
wave 2 but not in wave 6. These cases were eliminated. Another problem in wave 6 is that it does
not have information on shelter costs, which is needed to determine the appropriate amount of food31
stamps. To get this information, wave 7 is also merged into the main sample, which provides amounts
of rent and utilities paid during the survey month. Some missing cases again result; we keep these
families in the sample and assign them the sample mean of shelter costs.
3We determine whether a family is income-eligible for AFDC by using the maximum benefit in
each state, the family size, and an implicit tax rate estimated by Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf (1985).
Families that reported AFDC and were income-eligible were assumed to be recipients and to receive
the amount of AFDC specified by the formula. Families that reported AFDC but were not income-
eligible according to the formula were assumed to be recipients and to receive the amount they
reported, but were not allowed to change their labor supply. Because AFDC recipiency is
underreported, we imputed AFDC to some female-headed families who did not report it. Families that
did not report AFDC but were income-eligible according to the formula were considered recipients if
their predicted payment was at least $1000. This imputation corrects for underreporting. If the
predicted payment was less than $1000, we assumed they were not recipients, since all income-eligible
families do not receive AFDC, perhaps due to stigma. Further, because families with low amounts of
AFDC can move off AFDC fairly easily due to the assured benefit, this $1000 threshold ensures that
declines in AFDC caseloads are not primarily due to our imputation procedures.
4We impute food stamp recipiency to 86% of the families to whom we impute AFDC recipiency.
(This approximates the percentage of AFDC families who receive food stamps.) We do not impute
food stamp recipiency to any other families because the aggregate caseload that results from our
imputations is close to the caseload shown in administrative records.
5These estimating equations are available upon request.
6The groups that require imputation are custodial fathers, mothers who are currently married but
had children out of wedlock, and mothers who had no children from the most recent divorce or
separation but had children from an earlier divorce or separation. For custodial-father families, we use
the mean percentage with awards (27%) and the mean amount of child support ($1002), based on a
Wisconsin survey. For the other two types of families, we impute the probability of award and child
support payments by using a multivariate estimating equation based on SIPP data (see Kim [1993] for32
estimating equations). This imputation method is described more fully in Meyer, Garfinkel et al.
(1991) and Kim (1993).
7Actually, the CBO requested that we provide estimates for the first and third scheme. We have
decided to also present the second scheme so that the effects of a larger benefit can be differentiated
from the effects of allowing cooperators to receive the benefit. In the research for the CBO, we also
estimated a scheme in which cooperators were allowed to receive an even higher assured benefit:
$3000/year for one child; $4000 for two children; $5000 for three children; $6000 for four children;
and $7000 for five or more children. For simplicity, we do not present these results here; they are
available upon request, however.
8Note also that we compare the official poverty line to cash income plus food stamps minus taxes
for each family, and thus these figures are not directly comparable to official poverty rates.
9As noted above, because an assured benefit has opposing effects on AFDC and non–AFDC cases,
the net effect on the hours worked of all women is not predictable a priori. Similarly, increasing the
amount of the assured benefit should magnify both the positive effect for AFDC cases and the
negative effect for non–AFDC cases, and thus the direction of changes in the aggregate labor supply
of all women under increasing assured benefits is not predictable. Further, making more people
eligible for an assured benefit (allowing cooperators) should also magnify the positive effect for AFDC
cases and the negative effect for non–AFDC cases, again leading to unpredictable aggregate effects.
We predict here that mean hours decline by five hours annually when moving from the low-award-
only scheme to the middle-award-only scheme. When cooperators are allowed in the middle scheme,
mean hours increase by five hours annually.
10Almost all of these savings result from increases in tax collections. A small amount (less than
$100 million in each scheme) comes from other savings.
11Although the percentage of nonworking AFDC recipients who begin to work is the same under
the taxed and the untaxed benefit for all three schemes, the change in hours for AFDC recipients
decreases a little under the taxed benefit in the two middle-level schemes (not shown on table). Under
the taxed benefit, AFDC women are not predicted to increase hours by as much as under the untaxed33
benefit, and non–AFDC women are not predicted to decrease hours by as much as under the untaxed
benefit. The former effect outweighs the latter, leading to lower aggregate hours of work in the
middle scheme-cooperators.
12We include earnings and unearned income but do not include welfare or child support in the
calculation of income that determines the benefit reduction range and the breakeven point for this
assured benefit.
13Recall that because of the opposing effects on AFDC and non–AFDC families, allowing
cooperators does not necessarily lead to a particular direction in the aggregate effect.
14For example, assume that a woman works 12 hours a week; then: "current number of hours per
week" = 12; "every hour per week for 5 hours below and above the current number of hours" = 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, or 17 hours a week; "every 5 hours elsewhere between 0 and 60
hours/week" = 0, 5, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, or 60 hours a week (10 and 15 hours a week are
covered in the previous item).
15The way we changed the elasticities for the lower elasticity runs was through the delta term in
the utility function (see Appendix I). Because this term is the same for wives and husbands, setting
the elasticity for wives sets the elasticity for husbands. In the test of higher elasticities, we doubled
the rate for female heads. If we had followed the same procedure for wives, the elasticity for
husbands would have become much higher than is thought feasible. Therefore, we also adjusted the
alpha term in the utility equation. Further information is available on request.
16CAP also provides the cash value of food stamps rather than the food coupons and provides
some child care assistance.3435
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